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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a new analysis of Chinese labor politics. Most scholars suggest that there 
is no labor movement in China because Chinese labor protests are apolitical, cellular, and 
short-lived, and thus inconsistent with the properties of social movements identified in the 
political process model. In contrast, the author draws on Gramsci’s ideas regarding 
counterhegemonic movements and on ethnographic and archival research to demonstrate that 
the activities of movement-oriented labor NGOs (MLNGOs) coupled with associated labor 
protests since 2011 constituted the embryo of a counterhegemonic labor movement. 
MLNGOs have reworked the hegemonic labor law system to undermine the regime’s legal 
atomization of workers, nurtured worker leaders as organic intellectuals of migrant workers 
to temporarily substitute for impotent workplace unions, and developed alternative 
organizational networks of labor organizing that challenged monopolistic union bureaucracy. 
This incipient counterhegemonic movement persisted several years after state repression in 
late 2015 but was curtailed by another wave of repression in January 2019. The very severity 
of state repression suggests that a counterhegemonic movement has been formed.   
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Despite thousands of strikes each year and the activities of movement-oriented labor NGOs 
(MLNGOs) in China, most scholars of China’s labor activism question whether these 
activities resulted in a “labor movement”. The source of their pessimism is the notion that 
Chinese labor unrest is apolitical, cellular, and short-lived, falling short of the stylized image 
of social movements portrayed by prominent political process theorists, who view 
movements largely as massive, organized national scale protests over political issues. Despite 
growing criticisms of the political process model and its shortcomings under authoritarian 
regimes, the dominant pessimistic perspective prevails over the views of a minority of 
scholars who hold more sanguine views regarding whether labor protests constituted a 
“movement”.  
  In this paper, I draw on Antonio Gramsci’s insight regarding hegemony and 
counterhegemony to elucidate an alternative framework of what constitutes a social 
movement. A counterhegemonic approach to movements emphasizes three facets: reworking 
hegemonic ideology and apparatus, nurturing organic intellectuals/leaders of the proletariat, 
and developing alternative organizational networks for progressive practice. I argue that the 
activism of MLNGOs, coupled with protests during the 2011 to 2018 period, constitute such 
a counterhegemonic labor movement.  
Drawing on archival and ethnographic data from eleven MLNGOs and striking 
workers during the 2011-2019 period, I show how MLNGOs reworked the regime’s 
hegemonic apparatus—the labor law system—to undermine legal atomization, nurtured 
worker leaders as organic intellectuals of migrant workers to temporarily substitute for 
workplace unions, and developed alternative organizational networks for labor organizing to 
challenge monopolistic union bureaucracy. Although funded mainly by international sources, 
the MLNGOs mobilized and organized workers to engage in collective bargaining in ways 
similar to Western trade unions before their institutionalization. Four MLNGOs continued 
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their activities as before in the three fronts despite state repression since late 2015. However, 
a recent arrest of MLNGO activists in early 2019 exterminated or incapacitated the MLNGOs 
and the movement. My argument and the comprehensive evidence presented in this paper 
contributes to the literature on Chinese labor politics by providing a new analysis of labor 
organizing in China.  
Does China Have A Labor Movement? 
China has witnessed waves of worker unrest since its transition to a market economy, which 
was launched in 1978. Millions of veteran state workers left jobless by the reform took to the 
street in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Cai 2002; Chen 2000:41). A few years later, a new 
force of private sector workers – mostly rural-to-urban internal migrant workers— 
increasingly protested sweatshop conditions (Chan 2010; Elfstrom and Kuruvilla 2014; Lee 
2003, 2007;). For instance, a commonly cited source of strike information in China—the 
China Labor Bulletin—recorded a rising number of strikes in the 2010s, from 185 in 2011 to 
2660 in 2016 and 1702 in 20181.  
 
The Dominant Pessimistic View of China’s Labor Protests 
However, the dominant view among researchers is that mounting labor militancy in 
China does not amount to a labor movement. (Blecher 2002; Chen 2016; Chen and Gallagher 
2018; Elfstrom and Kuruvilla 2014; Friedman 2014 a, b; Franceschini 2014; Leung 2015; 
Kuruvilla 2018; Lee 2003, 2016). This dominant view holds that there is no movement in 
China because of three characteristics of worker militancy. First, Chinese workers’ protests 
address mainly economic issues and do not put forth political demands such as the right to 
strike or the need for independent unions (Friedman 2014 a:19). That is, workers’ resistance 
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 CLB changed the data collection and reporting method in 2017 and recorded less strikes since then.  
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is legalistic (i.e., pursuing legal entitlements and relying on legal channels), and self-limiting 
to state-defined boundaries (Lee 2016:33).  
        Second, Chinese labor activism is considered “cellular” because worker mobilization 
rarely goes beyond the factory gate and is localized at the workplace level without cross-
workplace/region coordination (Lee 2007; Friedman and Lee 2010; Chen 2016: 25). This 
leads to the conclusion that a broad-based labor movement has failed to emerge in China 
(Chen and Gallagher 2018). Elfstrom and Kuruvilla (2014: 458) commented, “no ‘organized 
labor movement’ is thriving in China nor is a ‘social movement’ as defined by Tilly and 
Tarrow (2007),” since Chinese strikes and protests did not come together to form a 
“campaign.” Third, Chinese labor activism is described as ephemeral, lacking sustained 
mobilization and enduring worker organizations (Chen 2016:25; Chen and Gallagher 2018; 
Friedman 2014a: 19). Chen (2016:25) noted that “almost all collective worker actions are 
short-lived” and “do not produce any sort of organization that could continue to exist 
afterwards.” 
   Yet, there exists a number of grassroots mobilizing organizations in China. Indeed, close 
to a dozen labor-oriented nongovernmental organizations (LNGOs) in Guangdong province 
have shifted from assisting individual workers (which Fu [2018:91] called disguised 
collective action) to helping workers elect representatives to collectively bargain with 
employers since 2011 (C. Li 2016; Chen and Yang 2017; Froissart 2017). This subset of 
LNGOs has been called MLNGOS (Chen and Yang 2017) or “solidarity machines” (Pringle 
2018). However, after the crackdown of a pioneering MLNGO in Guangzhou in December 
2015, Lee concluded that the number and impact of these MLNGOs were limited (2016:329), 
with limited success in building sustained organization in the face of state co-optation and 
repression (2017: 93). Similarly, Chen and Gallagher (2018) argued that despite the activities 
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of MLNGOs, legal procedures and the official union impeded the development of sustained 
collective action and a movement.  
   Against this dominant pessimistic assessment of Chinese worker protests, there are a few 
sanguine views. For instance, Pringle (2013) suggested that the strike waves by rural migrant 
workers in the auto industry in 2010 were forming a “nascent labor movement”, facilitated by 
labor shortages, LNGOs, and some reforms within the state. Several authors (Chan 2018; 
Smith, Brecher, and Costello 2007) have made casual reference to Chinese worker protests as 
a nascent labor movement, although they did not precisely define what a movement is.  
 
Theoretical Underpinning of the Pessimistic View: The Political Process Model  
    The argument that labor militancy does not amount to a “movement” is rooted in  
the political process model (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994), in which the attributes of a 
movement are that it should be large scale, political protests targeting the state. Thus, the 
apolitical, cellular, and short-lived protests in China does not qualify to be a movement.  For 
example, Friedman (2014b:19) explicitly described Chinese migrant workers’ resistance as 
an “insurgency” rather than a “movement” because, he wrote, “ ‘social movements’ as 
conceived of in classic works by political process theorists (McAdam 1982…) generally 
display the following characteristics: (1) relatively coherent political programs and well-
articulated goals; (2) a preponderance of formal ‘social movement organizations,’…(3) 
targeting of the state; (4) exploitation of political space that is available in liberal democracies 
(e.g., through public marches, media outreach, political lobbying, etc.)”2. Note that this list of 
movement properties can exclude different forms of activism in authoritarian regimes by 
definition because they do not use the contentious repertoires “available in liberal 
democracies.” An authoritarian context (such as China) not only limits feasible contentious 
                                                          
2
 These attributes resemble the four qualifying properties of social movement in Tarrow (1994: 4-5) and Tilly 
and Tarrow (2007:11).  
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repertoires (Tilly 2006), it also tends to constraint social movement organizations to informal 
networks and framing to include pragmatic claims (O’Brien and Stern 2008).  
    The political process model has itself been criticized from several perspectives within 
the social movement literature (Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattra 1999; Polletta and Jasper 
2001). Voss and Williams (2012) in particular highlighted the classic model’s neglect of 
community organizing and local social movements like the living wage movements in many 
US cities. Indeed, many social movement researchers have studied meso- and micro-level 
movement dynamics such as framing (Benford and Snow 2000) and emotions (Jasper 2011). 
Nevertheless, the conception of political movements on a national scale remained influential 
in Chinese labor studies, despite the argument by a key political process theorist—
McAdam—that the stylized image of social movements, based largely on the struggles in the 
1960s in the US as disruptive protest in public settings and loosely coordinated national 
struggles over political issues, threatened to distort our understanding of popular contention 
(McAdam et al. 2005:9, emphasis original). 
       Alternative conceptions of social movements (e.g., Piven and Cloward, 1979:4-5) 
emphasize the collective defiance of traditions and laws as the key feature of a protest 
movement. They (p.4) even consider “atomized acts of defiance” as movement events when 
“those involved perceive themselves to be acting as members of a group” and sharing a 
common set of protest beliefs. In other words, “cellular” protests may not inhibit movement 
formation. The protest movements covered in their classic book developed with sequences of 
short and long local protests (not one or few sustained mass protests) and declined after 
evolving into endurable formalized mass organizations. Similarly, influential new social 
movement scholar Melucci (1996:30) defines a movement as “contentious collective action 
that breaks the rules of the game and challenges the legitimacy of power”. In short, these 
conceptions of movement do not privilege political goals, large size, or endurable mass 
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mobilization or formal organizations, and, instead, underline the notion of a challenge to 
incumbent norms and legitimacy. Although alternative conceptions in new social movement 
tradition are helpful in understanding Chinese cellular protests, their theorization tends to see 
class and worker as one of many identities protesters articulate and usually considers labor 
movement as “old” social movement. I therefore draw on Gramsci’s (1971) insights, which 
emphasize both battles of ideas and the pivotal role of workers, fitting this paper’s focus on 
labor activism. A Gramscian approach allows me to highlight the features of a 
counterhegemonic labor movement that incorporate the seemly apolitical activities of 
Chinese MLNGOs and worker militancy that are only now starting to get the attention they 
deserve.  
A Gramscian Approach to Labor Movements 
Although Gramsci theorized hegemony and counterhegemony3 based mainly on western 
democratic capitalist societies, his insights have been widely applied to various contexts, 
including authoritarian regimes4. A hegemony project attempts to increase legitimacy or 
active consent from subordinate classes (goal) through continuous organization and 
hegemonic apparatus (process and tools) (Thomas 2013).  
 
State Hegemony in China 
       The Chinese state’s hegemony project has achieved uneven success: many classes such 
as entrepreneurs and professionals accepted authoritarianism (Wright 2010) and about eighty 
percent of respondents to waves of national surveys trusted in the central government (L. Li 
2016). The Chinese state’s paternalistic face (Friedman 2014a) and mass consent render 
Gramsci’s insights regarding hegemony an apt analytical tool. Indeed, Blecher (2002) and 
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 Gramsci used the term “hegemony from below” and his interpreters termed this counterhegemony (e.g., 
Carroll and Ratner 1994).  
4
 Researchers have studied hegemonic authoritarianism in fascist Italy and Singapore (Riley 2005; Sim 2006).  
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Hui (2016, 2017) have utilized Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to analyze labor politics in 
China. While Blecher (2002) found acceptance of state and market hegemony among many 
former state workers, Hui (2016) found that Chinese hegemony as mediated through the labor 
law system has influenced migrant workers unevenly with some assenting while a few do not 
consent. I extend their analysis by showing how migrant workers’ dissent is formed and 
organized to challenge state hegemony.    
     In the field of labor, the Chinese government has attempted to foster hegemony among 
working-class through legal incorporation (Gray 2010; Hui 2016) and “appropriated” 
representation (Friedman 2014b) based on monopolistic official unions. Crucial among the 
hegemonic apparatus is the labor law system (several pro-labor laws and conflict resolution 
system since 2008), which appears to provide a justice mechanism while concealing 
domination and inequity (Hui 2016). The underlying hegemonic ideology of legality induces 
employers and many workers to accept legislated procedures and minimum standards as the 
norm regarding terms of employment and ways to resolve conflicts (ibid). Many workers 
assent (ibid). However, this legal incorporation is atomized, based largely on individual 
employment rights with only a few vague principles on collective consultation and contracts.  
Chinese workplace unions remain subordinated to management control and are 
impotent to represent workers (Chen 2009; Kuruvilla and Zhang 2016; for very rare 
representative workplace unions, see Li and Liu 2018 and Pringle and Meng 2018). The 
central and regional union bureaucracies serve as part of the government organs (Chen 2009) 
and actively disseminate state discourse such as harmonious labor relations among workers 
(Hui and Chan 2013). Rising labor unrest prompted the state to push the official unions to 
build a “rainbow” between the state and workers. The government and union bureaucracies 
indeed carried out several national plans and policies to promote unionization and collective 
consultation from 2010 to 2014 (Liu and Kuruvilla 2017), trying to strengthen the “mass 
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base” of the Party-state. Whether the initiatives of the official unions enhance state legitimacy 
among workers was questionable (Friedman 2014b). But appropriated representation does set 
strong constraints on alternative forms of worker representation and thus restricts challenge to 
incumbent hegemony indirectly.  
These hegemonic apparatuses of China’s authoritarian regime paradoxically provide 
potential space for LNGOs to exploit and develop counter-hegemonic activities. After all, the 
LNGOs can use rights in law to mobilize workers and confront government officials and 
employer.  
 
Three Facets of a Counterhegemonic Movement 
For Gramsci, counterhegemony develops gradually in three fronts: reorganizing 
hegemonic apparatus and ideology, nurturing the organic intellectuals of the proletariat, and 
constructing an alternative organizational network for progressive praxis (Adamson 1980; 
Carroll 2010; Mouffe 1979). Firstly, counterhegemonic initiatives begin with a critique of 
hegemonic ideology and apparatus. It is not a process of introducing from scratch a totally 
new system, but of renovating and making “critical” an already existing activity (Gramsci 
1971: 330-1). That is, counterhegemony does not take the form of overhauling the whole 
system or putting forward nonexistent political claims on the state, but of appropriating and 
valorizing those elements within incumbent hegemony that are most consonant with the 
experience and interests of workers (Mouffe 1979:197-8; Burawoy 2003: 225). Thus, a key 
task is to unveil the inequity and injustice that are embedded in the hegemonic apparatus and 
to develop critical understanding among the masses. In doing so, the existing sociopolitical 
arrangements cease to be neutral and inevitable, but they are instead susceptible to change. 
Gramsci (1971:246) noted in particular that lapses in the justice system can make an 
especially disastrous impression on the public. Existing “structure ceases to be an external 
force…is transformed into a means of freedom, an instrument…a source of new initiatives” 
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(Gramsci 1971:367). That is, hegemonic ideology and apparatus are reorganized, 
undermining some elements while valorizing others toward progressive ends.     
   Second, a counterhegemonic movement must work incessantly to produce organic 
intellectuals who arise out of the masses and remain in close contact with their class (Gramsci 
1971:340). “Every social group, coming into existence...creates together with itself, 
organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness 
of its own function, not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields.” 
(ibid:5) Organic intellectuals of the proletariat seek to inspire workers’ confidence as 
historical actors (Adamson 1980:143). They not only express the demands of workers, but 
they also actively participate in practical life as organizers and persuaders (Gramsci 1971:10). 
To mobilize the mass, they “must be capable of re-living concretely the demands of” the 
mass and elaborating collective principles in most relevant fashion (ibid:340-1). Their 
emergence would be supported by collective struggles and a political party that Gramsci also 
called a “collective intellectual” (Adamson 1980:154, 207; Femia 1981:133).  
        Third, Gramsci thought that a political party or “Modern Prince” is an ideal institutional 
vehicle for a counterhegemony (Adamson 1980:207). He used “political party” in a loose 
sense to denote the loose coupling of individuals and organizations with similar interests and 
a similar ideology (Femia 1981:155). He suggested three elements in a party’s organizational 
network: at its core is a cohesive and coordinating central committee that innovates theory 
and strategy when necessary; second is the mass whose participation takes the form of 
discipline and loyalty; and third is an intermediate level of organic intellectuals of the 
proletariat maintaining contact between the first and second elements (Gramsci 1971:152-3; 
Adamson 1980: 212). As seen, a counterhegemonic political party cannot be reduced to a 
formal organization; rather, it is a provisional condensation of organizations and networks of 
individuals who continuously modify its composition as a progressive process in motion 
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(Thomas 2013:32). These networks shall also extend beyond workers to win the support of 
various social groups (Gramsci 1971:53).  
        Finally, counterhegemony is a dynamic long-term process that features evolving claims 
and tactics as well as progress and setbacks, confronting counter moves from incumbent 
hegemony. “One may say that no real movement becomes aware of its global character all at 
once, but only gradually through experience.” (Gramsci 1971:158) Such a dialectical process 
involves iterative exchange between mass and leaders and between movement from below 
and countermobilization from above (Thomas 2013:27). In particular, the central 
coordinating committee of alternative hegemony “can be more easily destroyed in that it is 
numerically weak, but it is essential that if it is destroyed it should leave as its heritage a 
ferment from which it may be recreated.” (Gramsci 1971:153) This ferment can be best 
formed and subsist among the mass and organic intellectuals (ibid).  
        In sum, a counterhegemonic movement works within the existent system to reorganize 
hegemonic apparatus and ideology and develop leaders and organizational networks for 
alternative progressive vision and practice. A counterhegemonic approach to social 
movements does not prioritize new political demands on the state or national scale protests, 
though these are good to have probably during climax moment to seize state power. Table 1 
compares a counterhegemonic approach to social movements to the prominent political 
process approach.  
--Table 1— 
Argument for a Counterhegemonic Labor Movement in South China    
      Based on the features of a counterhegemonic movement as elaborated above, I argue 
that MLNGOs and the associated protests from 2011 to 2018 in China harbored the embryo 
of a counterhegemonic labor movement. Specifically, the MLNGOs penetrated the labor law 
system and reorganized it. They used “rights” to embolden works to protest, while 
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simultaneously dissuading workers from relying on the official individualist conflict 
resolution system. They exposed the injustice of the justice system and convinced many 
workers to take concerted action through steps such as worker-led collective bargaining 
(WLCB), appropriating the state- and union-controlled collective consultation principles. In 
doing so, they reworked the elements of the labor law system—a key hegemonic apparatus—
and countered the regime’s legal atomization of workers. 
      Furthermore, MLNGOs nurtured a number of worker protest leaders/worker 
representatives as organic intellectuals of migrant workers. MLNGOs’ close contact with 
migrant workers helped build trust among workers, after which they used patient coaching 
and relevant language and experiences to develop worker leaders. The worker leaders 
articulated workers’ demands and organized collective protests following the repertoire of 
WLCB. They represented workers’ collective interests to both employer and government 
officials. They embodied temporary, issued-based worker organization that substituted for 
workplace unions, countering appropriated representation at the workplace level.  
     Finally, the MLNGOs forged alternative organizational networks to support workers’ 
struggles and to advocate for WLCB, which emphasized worker’s collective power and self-
representation. They coordinated a sequence of short and sustained WLCB protests in 
Guangdong and beyond. They built networks among worker representatives from various 
workplaces and between workers and other social groups such as scholars and lawyers. The 
MLNGOs served as a central coordination committee that linked to groups of workers via 
workplace representatives, countering the official union bureaucracies.   
    In short, the MLNGOs and mobilized workers countered legal atomization and 
appropriated representation while promoting alternative collective practice—WLCB, 
countering the state’s hegemonic project. They were perceived by the government as a 
movement, clear in the governments’ repressive responses. For example, seven activists in 
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Guangdong were arrested in December 2015. Moreover, the government undertook a national 
campaign on television and official media to delegitimatize the MLNGOs by unraveling “the 
true colors of ‘labor movement start’”5—the leader of a pioneering MLNGO in Guangzhou. 
In addition to outright repression, the Xi Jinping administration enacted a new foreign NGO 
law in 2017 to limit the financial resources for MLNGOs (Howell and Pringle 2018; Fu and 
Distelhorst 2018; Franceschini and Nesossi 2018). This heightened political constraint 
significantly reduced the number of MLNGOs and associated WLCB protest post-2016. 
Worse still, recent arrest of five MLNGO activists in January 2019 incapacitated the 
MLNGOs and the movement.   
Methods and Data 
 
This study focuses on a subsect of LNGOs in China. There were approximately 72 to1006 
LNGOs across China in the 2010s (C. Li 2016; Fu 2018:36). The majority of them focused 
on providing legal assistance or cultural/recreational activities to individual workers, 
shunning strikes. However, a subset of them in Guangdong province gradually changed to 
promote WLCB and facilitate collective protest since 2011. These MLNGOs developed in 
Guangdong because of its proximity to Hong Kong, the “offshore civil society of China” 
(Hung and Ip 2012; Pringle 2018), its more developed market economy relative to other 
Chinese provinces, and its more intensive labor conflicts.      
      This paper is based on archival and ethnographic data on all MLNGOs across China 
(which overtly organized WLCB protests) collected mostly in Guangdong from 2011 to 2018. 
I conducted participant observation in six MLNGOs in Guangdong from April 2013 to May 
2014 (four in Shenzhen and two at Guangzhou, see Appendix A). During that time, I worked 
at A(LW)—the coded name for an MLNGO in Shenzhen—as a volunteer, assisting its 
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 This was the title of a TV report in top CCTV program “morning news.”  
6
 Depending on how one defined and delineated the boundary of LNGOs. 
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director in documenting his training and mobilizing activities. Since A(LW) was at the center 
of a mainland network of MLNGOs that promote WLCB, I had plenty of opportunities to 
meet people from other MLNGOs as well as striking workers and visit them frequently. My 
participant observation sought to understand how they mobilized workers’ collective action 
and why they did so. I also observed eight strikes and three collective bargaining sessions. 
Many of the conversation and mobilization sessions were recorded with permission and then 
transcribed while key points were also written down in fieldnotes.  
  To reach MLNGOs beyond these six, I interviewed the heads of an MLNGO in Shenzhen 
(Dec. 2013) and one in Zhongshan city several times, to understand their main activities. 
Taken together, to my knowledge, I have observed or interviewed all the MLNGOs7 that have 
practiced WLCB in China by mid-20148. After leaving the field, I also conducted intensive 
open-ended interviews with MLNGO leaders in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018, and 2019 including 
the heads of three new MLNGOs founded in 2014 and 2015 (see Appendix A for details) to 
learn about any changes to their work due to the repression in late 2015. To understand how 
the MLNGOs influenced the worker leaders, I also interviewed 37 worker leaders who were 
formally elected by fellow workers at 13 workplaces.  
  To further extend and triangulate my observation, I also collected vast archival 
documents from the MLNGOs including their case records, annual reports, transcriptions of 
NGOs’ interviews with workers, and written reflections of LNGO staff and workers from 
2011 to 2018. Finally, an MLNGO staff member compiled for me a comprehensive set of 
materials (documents, videos, and scanned artifacts) regarding WLCB cases assisted by eight 
MLNGOs from 2011 to 2018.  
                                                          
7
 I did not include one LNGO in Shandong province that has occasionally facilitated worker collective action 
because it focused on legal assistance and did not promote steps of WLCB.  
8
 I did not include a few LNGOs that only provided training on collective bargaining but did not organize 
workers to practice WLCB. 
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   In total, I have observation, interview, or archival data on all the 11 MLNGOs and 63 
WLCB cases between 2011 and March 2018 (see Appendix B). The defining feature of these 
cases was that the workers elected worker representatives, although a few of these worker 
groups did not strike or have not succeeded in forcing recalcitrant employers into bargaining. 
Nine of the 11 MLNGOs (except G(DGZ) and H(HHC) which are less transparent about their 
mobilization process) have adopted similar steps of WLCB. The WLCB protocol included 
connecting with workers, helping workers elect representatives and formally authorizing 
worker leaders through signatures and red-thumbprints, aggregating workers’ demands, and 
coordinating collective action to pressure the employer into bargaining and concession. 
Specific tactics for each step varied to some extent across the MLNGOs and cases. I did not 
include dozens of short cases that left no clear information on the number of worker 
representatives and the time/methods by which the MLNGOs mobilized workers. Thus, the 
cases I analyzed represented only a portion of the struggles assisted by the MLNGOs, though 
they were the most comprehensive on this topic to date.  
 To protect the activists, I coded the names of MLNGOs and the staff members and 
workers quoted in the presentation below. I have also significantly simplified the names of 
the targeted enterprises in Appendix B. However, I mentioned a few specific firm names 
when the cases have already been widely disseminated on social media or academic 
publications.   
Findings: A Counterhegemonic Labor Movement in South China 
       
       I demonstrate below how activities of MLNGOs and associated protests fit each of the 
three features of a counterhegemonic movement. Further, I show how activism on the three 
fronts countered legal atomization and appropriated representation—the state’s hegemonic 
project.  
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Reworking the Labor Law System to Undermine Legal Atomization  
   The MLNGOs penetrated the hegemonic apparatus and dissected the labor law system 
into two parts: rights and procedures. They made good use of the rights written into the laws 
to raise workers’ rights consciousness and embolden workers to pursue their rights. 
Meanwhile, the MLNGOs revealed the problems in the legal procedures—the individualized 
dispute resolution system, persuading workers to forgo the prescribed conflict resolution 
mechanism. Instead, the MLNGOs taught workers to use WLCB to address their grievances, 
appropriating the few collective principles on collective consultation in the labor laws to 
buttress their advocacy. 
 
Using Rights to Embolden Workers 
 
The MLNGOs actively disseminated workers’ rights and legal entitlements to encourage 
workers to take action. Although some argued that the state’s hegemonic laws limited worker 
to legalistic claims and demotivated them from developing political demands to form a 
movement (Chen 2016; Friedman 2014a), knowing these rights was transformative for many 
workers. After all, law and legal consciousness contain simultaneously space of engagement, 
repression, and resistance (Silbey 2005: 346). Tens of thousands of workers learned about, 
for instance, overtime pay and paid leave for the first time from LNGOs. “This is the first 
time I heard about these rights. All along, we workers were entitled to these many things. 
Let’s ask the employer for them” was frequently uttered by workers during mobilization 
sessions.  
       Furthermore, legal support often consolidated workers’ conviction of the employers’ 
wrongness and increased their confidence in addressing their grievances. As Gallagher’s 
(2006) observation of legal aid plaintiffs showed, they often had only vague and imprecise 
knowledge of their codified rights and legal procedure. That MLNGOs show workers their 
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specific rights with particular legal articles can equip them “a source of righteousness and 
justice” (He, Wang, and Su 2013:709). For example, several workers from a textile factory in 
Shenzhen felt something was wrong when the employer on short-notice, decided to transfer 
batches of people to other departments. The workers believed that they have a just cause after 
learning from C(CF) that the employer must consult with workers to transfer them to posts 
not listed in the employment contract according to laws. They started to mobilize fellow 
workers and expressed gratefully that “with these legal articles [provided by A(LW)] we can 
argue confidently with the employer.”9 That MLNGOs use laws to mobilize workers echoes 
the findings of scholars working on other aspects of Chinese contentious politics such as 
rightful resistance of peasants (O’Brien and Li 2006), albeit not from a Gramscian 
perspective.  
 
Revealing Injustice in Legal Procedures 
 
While MLNGOs used legal rights to embolden workers, they also quickly exposed the high 
costs of upholding these rights through the official conflict resolution procedures—one 
voluntary mediation, one mandatory nonbinding arbitration, and two court hearings. Indeed, 
all the MLNGO leaders had experienced the heavy costs imposed by the official system. Four 
of the MLNGOs had rural migrant worker-turned founders that suffered injury at work and 
the cumbersome process to claim compensations. Another three rural migrant worker-turned 
founders spent months in the legal procedures to resolve their disputes with their former 
employers. Not only worker-turned founders, two founders with legal backgrounds (see 
Appendix A) were heartbroken when failing to help workers obtain justice even for simple 
disputes. For instance, the head of the pioneering MLNGO—A(LW)—burst into tears when 
reflecting how his first worker client died because of long-term process to qualify her for 
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occupational disease treatment. These bitter first-hand experiences resulted in “informed 
disenchantment” (Gallagher 2006), a crucial factor prompting them to explore alternative 
actions and to promote solidarity and collective action since 2011.  
     The greatest problem with the legal procedures exposed by MLNGOs was the long 
duration required by the official steps, which can enmesh disputing workers in the system for 
one to two years. The majority of the rural migrant workers cannot afford long stays in the 
cities without wages. The time-consuming steps constituted formidable barriers, especially 
for those workers who confront urgent issues such as factory relocation or layoffs. Here is an 
example of how G(DGZ) guided a group of 100 plastic molding workers facing impending 
factory relocation to take collective action. “They [workers] came in dozens, and a few of 
them knew that the issue was quite urgent. Factory relocation may take one to two months. 
But, with one to two months workers can only initiate arbitration. We analyze the steps in the 
legal procedures. They [workers] decided [to take collective action].”10 In fact, layoffs and 
factory closures or relocation among private sector firms became a serious trigger of labor 
conflicts in Guangdong after the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, over half (38) of the 63 WLCB 
cases I analyzed involved “rupture” disputes where workers demanded severance pay and 
restitution for lump sum pay violations to which they previously acquiesced.   
    A second common, but taxing, requirement by the dispute resolution system concerns 
evidence. Indeed, He et al.’s (2013:720) study of migrant workers in Western China found 
that these workers hold vastly different perception of what constitute evidence (common 
sense view like finished work) from the state’s version (e.g., formal employment contract). 
Workers often do not possess documents showing their employment or the time they first 
worked for the firm. This is a particularly important problem when workers want to obtain 
social insurance arrears. For instance, a group of 181 workers from the Hengbao jewelry 
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factory in Guangzhou was convinced that “there is no other way but collective action” after 
three activists from A(LW) explained that “we [workers] want back pay of social insurance 
from the time we entered this firm. But, the majority of workers do not have evidence of the 
exact time of their entry [some ten years ago]. These materials are held by the boss who does 
not have a legal obligation to provide evidence regarding social insurance beyond two years. 
So, if we choose the legal procedures, we cannot get social insurance arrears back to our 
entry dates.”11  
      MLNGOs also spotlighted the disempowering effects of the fragmenting legal 
proceedings. The labor law system fragments workers first by dividing workers into distinct 
categories, for instance, regular employees versus dispatched workers, and then further treats 
workers who apply for dispute resolution on an individual basis. Ignoring these fragmentary 
regulations, MLNGOs often encouraged workers to build solidarity with as many workers as 
possible regardless of their jobs and employment status. The most telling example in this 
regard is the protest at a Guangzhou university hospital. Three legally distinct groups of 
workers (nursing assistants, dispatched security guards, and regular security guards) were 
encouraged by B(PY) and A(LW) to take concerted action in May 2013. An activist from 
A(LW) explained to the worker representatives why workers should insist on collective 
bargaining instead of filing arbitration applications: “Firstly, when you enter arbitration or 
courts, even though you have these many people, they will examine your cases one by one, 
not as a collective. Each individual’s power is very weak. When the arbitrator or judge 
criticizes you, you as individual may not withstand the psychological stress…Second, the 
legal procedure takes a very long time…normally about one year…third, the process will 
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require much legally recognized evidence... Finally, and most importantly, you may not win 
after going through this long process.”12 
    Finally, MLNGOs sometimes explicated the failure of laws to cover all workers’ 
legitimate interests and used this to encourage collective action. For instance, wages beyond 
the legal minimum are often an issue for workers at declining companies who see a sharp 
decline in wages as a result of decreasing orders from overseas or factory relocation. In this 
regard, CHH, a former staffer of B(PY) and the founder of J(HG), has encouraged several 
groups of workers from Luenshing, Foshan, and Xinsheng to use collective bargaining to 
demand bottom-line wages beyond minimum wage. As CHH explained to a group of molding 
workers, “[The employer] violated no law. But, we workers deem it unfair… The only thing 
we can do under this circumstance is to rely on workers’ solidarity and concerted action. ”13 
CHH also advised workers to add legal violations such as absent social insurance and paid 
leave to justify workers’ protest and to increase workers’ bargaining chip to achieve their 
extralegal demands.  
 
Valorizing Vague Collective Principles in Laws   
  
While MLNGOs dissuaded workers from using the individualized resolution system, they 
appropriated the vague collective principles in law to justify collective protest and WLCB. 
When MLNGOs try to persuade a few workers to mobilize their fellow workers, they often 
need to provide elaborate legal basis and justification. Typical content in MLNGO training on 
collective bargaining is the laws and policies on collective consultation. MLNGOs 
specifically invoke general principles on collective consultation in 1995 Labor Law (Article 
33) and 2008 Labor Contract Law (Articles 4 and 51), which stipulate that unions or worker 
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representatives under the guidance of unions can negotiate and sign collective contracts with 
the employer. Interpreting these laws in accordance with workers’ interests, the MLNGOs 
downplay the official emphasis on the guiding role of unions and highlight the role of 
“worker representatives” instead. In fact, the MLNGO-promoted WLCB sidesteps the official 
unions, subverting official collective consultation by centering on workers’ participation and 
initiatives.  
       Interestingly, sometimes MLNGOs even invoke the Constitution to justify workers’ 
collective pursuit of their interests. For example, the head of C(CF) explained to a group of 
Nokia Donguan workers: “China’s Constitution provides that working class is the ruling class 
of this country…and it should have the right to participate in the distribution of company 
profit, which is completely appropriate, legal, and natural.”14 Like the empowering individual 
rights, the MLNGOs interpret vague collective rights in a way to embolden workers to take 
concerted action.  
 
Nurturing Organic Intellectuals of Migrant Workers to Temporarily Substitute for 
Workplace Unions 
  The MLNGOs challenged appropriated representation at the workplace level by 
cultivating organic intellectuals of migrant workers to organize collective action and 
represent workers to negotiate with the employer and government officials. These organic 
intellectuals mainly take the form of workplace representatives elected by fellow workers to 
coordinate their protest. The worker protest leaders articulate workers’ demands and defend 
workers’ collective interests in opposition to management and local government authorities.  
 
Connecting with and Teaching Workplace Leaders Organizing Skills 
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The MLNGOs’ close contact with migrant workers facilitated mobilization. As most 
MLNGO founders and staff members are former rural migrant workers (see Appendix A), 
these activists are a stratum of dedicated organic intellectuals of migrant workers. Their 
common experience and shared identity with the mass rural migrant workers allow them to 
understand workers’ concerns and express ideas easily accessible to workers. For example, 
some MLNGOs often use the daily life example of one chopstick versus a bundle of 
chopsticks to explain the power of solidarity. Even the head of A(LW)—a former rich 
lawyer—frequently talked about his short worker experience in the 1970s to connect with 
workers. In addition to leveraging common languages and shared experiences, the MLNGOs 
normally build trust among workers through shared Laoxiang identity (originating from the 
same county or province). Thus, a common ice-breaking question is “where are you from?” 
Furthermore, MLNGO activists’ previous success in helping individual workers also 
enhances workers’ trust in them. The workers who benefitted often came back to the 
MLNGOs when encountering workplace problems and introduced their relatives or fellow 
migrant workers to the MLNGOs. Direct and indirect ties with migrant workers and word of 
mouth helped expand MLNGOs’ reach to workers.   
   Likewise, the MLNGOs taught workers to activate their strong ties with fellow migrant 
workers to efficiently mobilize and organize collective action. It was typical for MLNGOs to 
ask workers to contact and mobilize their close friends at the factory after a mobilization 
session and bring their friends to the next session. After several mobilization sessions, those 
active workers (including middle- or low-level managers) that mobilized many fellow 
workers naturally became leaders. These leaders then communicated frequently with their 
close friends, who in turn communicated with their close friends, forming a ripple-like 
organizing network. As the head of A(LW) explained: “One worker representative[leader] 
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would have three to five strong supporters. Each of these three to five supporting workers, in 
turn, contact another three to five workers, and so on and so forth.”15 
  In addition to organizing network, the MLNGOs normally help workers conduct 
democratic election of workplace representatives. Workers cast their votes often by showing 
hands and, more importantly, sign their names and red-thumbprints (which means vow in 
Chinese culture). Indeed, election is such as crucial step of WLCB that MLNGOs usually 
record the election process, number of representatives elected, and total workers involved in 
their case records, supplemented by signatures and authorization papers. The number of 
elected worker leaders among the 63 cases ranged from 5 to 61 depending in part on the 
number of workers involved and the preferences of particular MLNGOs (see Appendix B), 
totaling 674 elected representatives in the eight years. 
   In addition to election, the MLNGOs also trained worker representatives to be 
accountable to workers, an important attribute of a worker organization. Accountability starts 
with collecting grievances from each worker and then discussing prioritization of demands 
with worker collective. Authorization letters for leaders typically specify the responsibilities 
and conduct of the elected representatives. Furthermore, MLNGOs taught worker leaders to 
constantly update progress/setback, report back to workers after every bargaining session, 
and sign collective agreement only after the majority of workers accepted it. Nine of the 
MLNGOs, except G(DGZ) and H(HHC), explicitly promoted these election and 
accountability practices among worker leaders.  
 
Inspiring Workplace Representatives’ Confidence to Negotiate with Employers and Officials   
 
The MLNGOs also increased worker leaders’ confidence to articulate workers’ collective 
interests and bargain with the employers and officials through sustained and patient coaching. 
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Many worker representatives fear top managers, let alone confronting them, a situation 
shaped by long-term despotic factory regime. As a female worker representative ZWN 
accounted, “I could not utter words when we [representatives] entered [the boss’s office] for 
the first time. I have worked here for 10 years but have barely seen the boss’s face. I myself 
am a humble worker and very much fear the top managers.”16 The MLNGOs spent endless 
hours encouraging workplace representatives through legal counseling, home visits, and 
mock bargaining, tactics commonly practiced by B(PY), D(XYH), and J(HG). Among the 63 
WLCB cases, the MLNGOs took an average of 4.6 months to contact workers, cultivate 
workplace leaders, and help leaders sustain collective action (see the column of “mobilization 
time” in appendix B which counted the time when the MLNGOs got in touch with workers to 
the time of conflict settlement or action dissolution). 
       MLNGOs’ patient coaching has transformed many otherwise timid migrant workers into 
worker leaders. Several workplace representatives (at least six that I interviewed) joined or 
founded MLNGOs to become dedicated advocate for migrant workers’ rights and 
mobilization. For example, a former worker representative HXJ described her change into an 
articulate worker leader and the important support from MLNGOs: “before interacting with 
B(PY), my Mandarin was awful. I could not articulate well. When I first came here [B(PY)], 
I could not speak much…Another major obstacle was fear…Every time we came here 
[B(PY)], we expressed our concerns, what to do and how to say. They [B(PY) staff] taught us 
many techniques, resolved some of our concerns and increased our confidence…We asked 
them for copies of the labor laws, and they explained them to us well and answered our 
queries. Gradually, I was not so afraid [of defending workers’ rights].”17After leading one-
year collective bargaining at a jewelry factory from 2012 to 2013, HXJ joined an MLNGO as 
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a collective bargaining consultant and spoke confidently about workers’ rights during an 
interview for a local TV program in 2015.   
    Besides confronting employers, MLNGOs also enhanced workplace leaders’ confidence 
to contend with government officials. Workers typically are anxious about police and arrest 
during collective action. To address this concern cognitively, MLNGOs constantly emphasize 
that defending workers’ interest is just or righteous, thus, protesting workers should not fear 
policemen whose job is to fight criminals. Technically, MLNGOs, especially A(LW), B(PY), 
and J(HG),  often provide training to leaders on risk management before striking or street 
protest, including how to maintain order during street action, arranging females in front lines 
to reduce physical conflict with policeman, and assigning a few workers the task of taking 
photos/videos of encounters with police or officials. Moreover, as the MLNGOs have ample 
experience with police or security officials during their daily work or when assisting worker 
action, they often use these personal experiences to demystify police power. A telling episode 
is how a staff member of B(YP) emboldened the worker representatives at Luenshing, 
addressing their fear of police by telling his story: “Over the past dozen years, I have 
overcome many local policemen. Back to 2006…one policeman did not record facts [as 
required by law] after my fellow worker reported a case. I immediately took the worker to 
police office and asked to meet their director… The director called and ordered the policeman 
to ‘get your ass back.’…My complaint stressed him [policeman] to sweat… Policemen fear 
losing their jobs. Don’t think little of us migrant workers. When you speak boldly…the police 
will behave.”18 These personal experiences revealed legal rules that constrained police 
behavior as well as their concerns. These worker representatives were inspired to debate 
boldly with the policemen and other government officials who attempt to dissolve their two-
month strike.  
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Training Workplace Leaders to Speak to the Public through Social Media 
 
MLNGOs also encouraged workplace representatives to articulate and disseminate workers’ 
protests and their rationales behind the protests on social media to present migrant workers’ 
stories to the public. The majority of MLNGOs consider social media usage a core training 
for the worker leaders, who learned to create accounts in various blogs and micro-blogs to 
post their collective action. Workplace leaders reported dozens of WLCB protests on social 
media from 2012 to 2015 when microblogs enjoyed widespread popularity. In these social 
media posts, workplace leaders described workers grievances and explained why workers’ 
demands were legitimate (e.g., employer violated the law). Timely updates on protests often 
revealed employers’ unresponsiveness or hostility to workers’ legitimate demands. 
Sometimes police brutality was also reported, which often attracted attention from the public.  
       In addition to publicizing particular protests, some MLNGOs sometimes helped workers 
articulate and publicize their needs on general issues. For instance, on May 1, 2014, F(XXC) 
issued a Labor Day Statement on social media explaining rural migrant workers’ contribution 
to economic development, the injustice of denying them social security, and the urgency for 
Shenzhen city government to enact new social insurance policies. This Statement was signed 
by 1200 workers from various factories. Continuing the campaign, F(XXC) further helped a 
group of worker representatives from a few factories to report problems in paying long-term 
retrospective social insurance contribution in a half-hour CCTV program in October 2015.  
   Overall, workplace representatives lead temporary, issue-based worker organizations to 
address particular workplace grievances. Many of these workplaces do not have a union 
while others have unions with leaders appointed by the employer. The workplace 
representatives substitute for the absent or impotent workplace unions by organizing workers 
and representing them to bargain with management. These representative-led temporary 
worker organizations dissolved after the collective achieved its demands or was defeated by 
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the employer or government. Afterwards, a few representatives joined MLNGOs while some 
became committed volunteers of MLNGOs. In this connection, B(PY) and J(HG) were 
particularly effective in maintaining networks of former workplace representatives. Finally, 
many former workplace representatives moved on to new jobs at different locations, carrying 
their leadership skills and the practice of WLCB to various places. 
 
Developing Organizational Networks for Labor Organizing as Alternative to Official 
Union Bureaucracies 
    The MLNGOs challenged the monopolistic position of union bureaucracies by 
developing alternative organizational networks to support workers’ collective struggles. The 
core repertoire of this movement—WLCB—has evolved to include two related elements 
since 2015: worker self-representation (gongren daibiao zhi) and collective bargaining. The 
former directly challenged appropriated representation. Similar to the official union structure, 
which basically comprises union federations embedded at various governments and 
workplace unions, the MLNGOs function like regional unions linked with several workplace 
branches led by workplace representatives. Whereas the union bureaucrats are disconnected 
from the workers, the MLNGOs integrate workers in three-level organizational networks: 
MLNGOs in the center, the intermediate element of workplace leaders, and mass 
participating workers.  
 
Developing MLNGOs as the Core of Alternative Organizational Networks 
 
 
At the core of these alternative organizational networks are the MLNGOs, which form a 
networked center to coordinate worker collective action. A(LW) is an early developer and 
promoter of WLCB among LNGOs. With two WLCB cases in late 2011, it experimented 
core steps of WLCB (authorizing independent workplace leaders and bargaining) suitable to 
the Chinese institutional context bereft of representative unions. As a law firm, it then worked 
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closely with B(PY) in Guangzhou, and to a less extent with C(CF) in Shenzhen, to develop 
protocol for NGOs to coordinate collective action from 2011 to 2012. Three successful 
WLCB cases by the summer of 2012 proved WLCB to be a viable mobilizing strategy in 
China, accepted by workers and tolerated by the state. These early trials made WLCB a 
modular collective action (Tarrow 1994), capable of diffusing to many LNGOs and worker 
groups under various situations. Meanwhile, a LNGO in Hong Kong with financial resource 
actively supported WLCB among mainland LNGOs in early 2010s. By the end of 2012, 
modular WLCB and funding allowed the transformation of five LNGOs into MLNGOs in 
Guangdong (D(XYH) and E(ZS) in addition to the abovementioned A, B, and C), which 
collaborated closely with each other due to common funding. Modularization of WLCB and 
resources are the driving force behind the movement’s escalation in scale in 2013 and 2014, 
supporting close to 20 WLCB protests each year (see Appendix B).  
  Pulled by viable modular WLCB protocol and pushed by futility of previous 
individualized approach, another three LNGOs—F(XXC), G(DGZ), H(HHC) in Shenzhen—
changed to practicing WLCB in 2013. This continuous development of MLNGOs and 
associated WLCB protests bred three spin-off MLNGOs by former workplace representatives 
and staff members in 2014 and 2015: I(XGY) in Shenzhen, J(HG) in Guangzhou, and 
K(HZZ) in Guangzhou (shortly from May to December 2015 before arrest of the head). 
Among these MLNGOs, there was another cluster: F(XXC), G(DGZ), I(XGY) which were 
influenced by another LNGO funder in Hong Kong to support each other. The two MLNGO 
clusters supported by two distinct Hong Kong funders were bridged primarily by A(LW) 
which explicitly collaborated with most MLNGOs except G(DGZ) and H(HHC) (see 
Appendix B for the pattern of collaboration in WLCB protests).   
    In total, 11 MLNGOs in the Pearl River Delta have organized worker protests before the 
repression at the end of 2015 (see Appendix A for the list of MLNGOs). The MLNGOs, 
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except G(DGZ) and H(HHC), adopted the modular WLCB steps and collaborated with each 
other, contrary to Franceschini’s (2014) comment that the LNGOs were too fragmentary to be 
seen as a movement.  
 
Three-level Organizational Networks in Action 
 
The 11 MLNGOs coordinated a sustained sequence of collective protests in Guangdong and 
beyond since 2011 (see Appendix B). They mobilized more than 24 thousand workers across 
various companies through the bridge of workplace representatives. Beside linking with the 
specific MLNGO(s) that assisted them, these workplace leaders were often connected with 
representatives from other firms via MLNGOs. For instance, B(PY) simultaneously 
coordinated four collective protests in June 2013 and often met with workplace 
representatives from multiple factories to discuss progress and contention tactics. 
Furthermore, A(LW), B(PY), and C(CF) held a tradition of organizing victory parties to 
celebrate workers’ successful protests, and such occasions tended to be attended by dozens or 
hundreds of workers and worker representatives from various firms who shared their protest 
tactics and encouraged each other. Through these activities, MLNGOs forged networks 
connecting workplace leaders and workers from nearby factories.  
   The MLNGOs also fostered specific worker networks concentrating in a particular 
industry. For instance, nine of the 63 WLCB cases concerned the jewelry industry at 
Guangzhou. A driving force was a MLNGO activist, CHH, who used to be a jewelry worker 
and has established a stronghold among the jewelry workers at Panyu district in Guangzhou. 
CHH once said that he could easily establish a jewelry industry union if the government 
permitted it19. His reputation and success with WLCB cases among jewelry workers have 
inspired dozens of protests at Panyu, a regional nodal point of WLCB protests.  
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  Moreover, a few MLNGOs have targeted various Walmart workplaces across China. 
A(LW) in particular has been mobilizing Walmart workers in Shenzhen since 2011, 
providing dozens of training to Walmart workers from various stores. Outside Shenzhen, 
A(LW) has assisted a protest against Walmart store closure in Hunan province and contacted 
protesting workers from Walmart workers in Anhui province in late March 2014. A(LW)’s 
support has nurtured several committed Walmart worker activists including ZLY and WSH 
based in Shenzhen, who together with Walmart worker ZJ from Shangdong province 
established the Walmart China Worker Association in September 2014 to reach thousands of 
Walmart workers in China.  
 
Forging Networks between Workers and Various Social Groups 
 
In addition to educating and organizing workers, MLNGOs also forged networks between 
workers and various social groups. Most important in this regard is building workers’ 
networks with scholars and students. A(LW) in particular has organized more than 10 
conferences involving scholars, workers, and reform-minded government officials to discuss 
pathways to effect collective labor rights. It also managed a magazine called “Research on 
Collective Bargaining Institutions” to publish articles from labor activists and pro-labor 
scholars from 2011 to 2015 when it faced heightened restrictions. In addition to creating 
discursive environment, MLNGOs invited scholars and students to support workers’ protests. 
For example, MLNGO activists involved prominent labor scholars in Beijing and Changsha 
(Hunan) to support workers’ protest at Walmart store in Changde (see Li and Liu 2018 for 
details). Activists involved students to support sanitation workers’ strike in Guangzhou 
University Town (see Xu and Schmalz 2017 for details). Moreover, the MLNGOs regularly 
invited labor or human rights lawyers to support workers, especially when they were sacked 
by management or detained by police. For instance, a MLNGO swiftly summoned 12 lawyers 
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(including five human rights lawyers) to represent the 12 workers arrested during a protest at 
a Guangzhou Hospital in early September 2013.  
    Finally, the mainland MLNGOs are supported by an international network of labor 
activists and funders, many of which are located in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong LNGOs 
channel funding and international discourse to the MLNGOs. Hong Kong-based China Labor 
Bulletin in particular played crucial role in supporting seven MLNGOs in Guangdong to 
promote WLCB and fostering networks among the latter. Further, the Hong Kong LNGOs 
including CLB and other university- or union-based groups also coordinated international 
campaigns to support mainland MLNGOs and workers’ struggles (for more details see 
Pringle 2018). 
         MLNGOs’ activism on the three fronts developed rapidly in 2013 and 2014, the 
interface years between Hu-Wen administration (2003-2013) and the Xi Jinping era. While 
Hu-Wen regime was relatively open to local experimentation and input from social actors, the 
Xi regime consolidated party control over civil society groups including MLNGOs since 
2015 (Howell and Pringle 2018; Fu and Distelhorst 2018). The crackdown on pioneering 
B(PY) and arrest of seven activists in December 2015 signaled the state’s disapproval of this 
bottom-up labor movement. In 2015, state repression closed three MLNGOs—B(PY), 
I(XYH) and K(HZZ), after forcing E(ZS) to close in 2014. Political hostility also forced 
F(XXC), G(DGZ), and H(HHC) to re-orient to service and legal training and sometimes 
engage in clandestine organizing without publicity20.   
 
State Repression and MLNGO Activism Post 2015  
    Since late 2015, the political space for MLNGOs has contracted substantially. However, 
several groups have continued their programs as before, creatively dodging pressures. On the 
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investigation of the Jasic incident in the summer of 2018.  
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front of reworking the labor law system, the active four overt MLNGOs- A(LW), C(CF), 
I(XGY), J(HG))—carried out regular legal training, through which they continued to criticize 
the labor law system and promote the ideas and repertoire of WLCB to many workers. 
I(XGY) and J(HG) in particular carried out approximately one legal training session for a few 
to a few dozen workers each week over the years, while A(LW) and C(CF) provided training 
less frequently. One participant observer of I(XGY) and J(HG) commented that they were 
very busy and active in the summer of 201821.  
  On the front of nurturing organic intellectuals of migrant workers, the remaining 
MLNGOs continued developing worker leaders through collective action, coaching 102 
workplace representatives in 10 WLCB cases from 2016 to 2018 (see Table 2). The 
MLNGOs creatively dodged official red-lines to teach workers leaders mobilizing skills. For 
example, J(HG) asked workers to come to his Center to discuss action strategies instead of 
mobilizing workers at workplaces, which was warned by Guangzhou security officials who 
have sympathy toward his work. In Shenzhen I(XGY) interpreted the restriction of street 
protest as allowing within-factory action and helped dozens22 of worker groups’ collective 
action. He often played a cat-and-mouse game with security officers. For instance, he 
provided training to workers from Simone at Guangzhou in late 2017 below the radar of 
officers in both cities. He helped Simone workers elect 30 worker representatives and 
coordinate a nine-day, 1,000 worker strike in early March 2018. In general, the MLNGOs 
took a low-key strategy without politicizing collective protests on social media, as warned by 
local security officials23. This no-exposure, low-key strategy in part contributed to some 
external observers’ perception that the MLNGOs were not active anymore.  
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--Table 2-- 
   On the front of building alternative organizational networks, although the active 
MLNGOs have significantly reduced mass meetings of workers from various factories, they 
continue to coordinate worker networks primarily through social media like WeChat groups. 
Each of the four MLNGOs manages WeChat forums comprising of 60 to over 170 members 
(mainly workers and people interested in labor issues) where NGO staff members and 
workers can share legal and protest information, albeit less frequently after 2015. 
Furthermore, A(LW) and C(CF) involved themselves in Walmart China Worker Association’ 
mobilization of twenty thousand Walmart workers across China to protest against a new 
flexible hour policy via dozens of WeChat groups from May 2016 to 2017.  
   Moreover, the MLNGOs have expanded legal training and network building to include 
Marxist or leftist student groups. One MLNGO in Shenzhen, in particular, provided training 
to college students since 2017 and thus has built strong ties with a few Marxist students who 
played crucial role in supporting the widely reported protest of Jasic workers from July to 
September 201824. The MLNGOs also coordinated their advice and financial support to the 
Marxist students through WeChat forums established in previous years.  
     On the other hand, the very severity of state repression suggests that a counterhegemonic 
movement has been formed. Indeed, some stability maintenance officials categorized the 
MLNGOs as a faction that “loosens the soil” [shaking the mass foundation of the state] 25. 
After the crackdown in December 2015, five current and former activists of three MLNGOs 
in Shenzhen—A(LW), C(CF), and I(XGY)—were detained on January 20, 2019. They face 
criminal charge of disturbing social order and remain in jail as of August 2019. This 
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repression exterminated I(XGY) and C(CF) whose leaders are arrested. Currently, only 
J(HG) remains active in providing legal training (criticizing the legal system and advocating 
alternative tactics) based on funding from foreign embassies, while A(LW) is severely 
handicapped. This second Shenzhen-focused repression may relate to the Jasic incident in 
Shenzhen whereby Marxist students’ use of original Marxist ideas challenged the state’s 
claim of its Marxist inherence, attacking one core element of state hegemony. The resultant 
tense political climate may be seized by some anti-NGO officials to justify wiping out the 
MLNGOs in Shenzhen.  
  Discussion 
 
Drawing on Gramsci’s ideas I argue in this paper that there was an embryonic labor 
“movement” in China from 2011 to 2018. In so doing, I am providing an alternative 
perspective to the dominant literature on labor activism in China, which has argued that the 
apolitical, cellular, and short-lived protests imply that there was no labor movement in China. 
Consistent with Gramsci’s analysis of counterhegemony, I show that MLNGOs and 
associated protests manifested three facets of a counterhegemonic movement.  
    Admittedly, the MLNGO-spearheaded labor movement was in its embryonic stage. The 
MLNGOs and workers have not yet put forward a fully-fledged counterhegemonic ideology 
to mobilize massive workers or rally with wider social groups. Nor have they critiqued 
capitalism, the market economy or one-party autocratic rule. They focused on partially 
countering state hegemony, leaving market hegemony largely intact. The MLNGOs’ 
advocacy of WLCB without a systematic ideology was less a deficit than a pragmatic choice. 
After all, the MLNGOs knew too well the government’s unrelenting repression of 
movements with ideological claims (e.g., the Falungong movement) amidst selective 
toleration of pragmatic protests. 
35 
 
    My argument and finding that the MLNGOs coupled with associated protests constituted 
a movement, even if they were small (especially given only four surviving MLNGOs post 
2015), contrasts with the dominant view from political process theorists that movements must 
be large scale political mobilization against the state. My evidence here is consistent with 
alternative conceptions and examples of small movements. For example, Ganz (2000) 
referred to a single union (the United Farm Workers) organizing agricultural workers as the 
California farm workers’ movement.  The “Trotskyism movement” in the UK comprised 
three organizations with a grand total of just 124 members in the 1950s and peaked in the 
1980s with 15 organizations and a little over 20,000 membership across England (Kelly 
2018:41).  
      Although state repression in late 2015 diminished this movement and the recent 
repression in early 2019 incapacitated the MLNGOs, the impact of this movement has not 
been completely wiped out. Indeed, Gramsci acknowledged that central coordination 
committees of counterhegemonic movements, being numerically weak (small), can be easily 
destroyed but underscored that if destroyed the committee should leave ferment among 
workers and organic intellectuals. I suggest in this paper that MLNGOs have left such a 
ferment. After all, the dozens of former MLNGO staff members, 674 elected workplace 
leaders, and over 24 thousand workers have critiqued the labor law system, practiced 
collective solidarity and WLCB, and established networks. From this ferment, a labor 
movement could grow in the future. 
Conclusion 
 
The dominant view in prior literature on Chinese labor activism suggests that the workers’ 
apolitical, cellular, and short-lived protests does not constitute a labor movement. This view 
is based on the political process model that depicts a stylized image of a movement in terms 
of massive, organized, and political protests (McAdam et al. 2005). I draw on Gramsci’ work 
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on the three features of counterhegemonic movements to argue that MLNGOs and associated 
worker protests constituted an embryonic counterhegemonic labor movement. Specifically, 
my ethnographic and archival data from 2011 to 2018 show that MLNGOS a) reworked the 
hegemonic labor law system to undermine the regime’s legal atomization, b) nurtured worker 
leaders who represented and defended workers’ collective interests to temporarily substitute 
for impotent workplace unions, and c) developed organizational networks for labor 
organizing to challenge the official union bureaucracies. 
         My argument and findings contribute to China labor studies by providing a new 
analysis of labor unrest. The Gramscian framework of counterhegemonic movements permits 
a positive and much-deserved focus on aspects of Chinese MLNGO activism and worker 
organizing. My study also presents more comprehensive empirical evidence regarding 
MLNGOs activities and WLCB protests over the past decade in China. And my argument 
and findings contribute to the small but growing number of studies that suggest an alternate 
conception of what constitutes a “movement” (e.g., Voss and Williams 2012).   
      Currently, the Xi Jinping administration’s repression of civil society including MLNGOs 
has curtailed the development of this embryonic counterhegemonic labor movement. The Xi 
regime’s suppression of labor is however not without paradoxical ramifications from the 
perspective of counterhegemonic analysis of movement development. Specifically, after the 
2008 financial crisis, the current regime entered a new normal of slow growth (Lee 2017), 
which means the erosion of the hitherto economic performance that enabled it to win the 
consent of various social groups. At a time of a waning economic base for incumbent 
hegemony, the current regime’s enhanced coercive face is likely to create a “crisis of 
authority” when “the ruling class lost its consensus, i.e., no longer ‘leading’ but only 
‘dominant’, exercising coercive force alone” (Gramsci 1971:275-6). Consequently, enhanced 
authoritarianism, on the one hand, constrains the organizational resources for subaltern 
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groups to organize themselves. However, on the other hand, an ostensible coercive face may 
also create widespread dissent in society, a situation that is vulnerable to the development of 
alternative hegemony.    
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Political process approach Counter-hegemonic approach
Empirical focus Massive organized political protests Critique incumbent hegemonypromote alternative ideas and practice
Image of 
movement
-Contention over political issues*
-Loosely coordinated national struggles 
-durable mobilization and formal 
organizations
-Reorganize hegemonic ideology/apparatus
-Nurture organic intellectuals
-Build alternative organizational networks
Chinese labor 
activism
Not a labor movement: 
-no political demands  
-cellular protests
-no sustainable mobilization or 
organization
A embryonic counter-hegemonic labor movement:
-rework labor law system to undermine legal 
atomization
-nurture worker leaders/organic intellectuals to 
substitute workplace unions
-alternative MLNGO**-centered organizational 
network for labor organizing to challenge official 
union bureaucracies
Table 1.  Comparing Political Process and Counter-hegemonic Approaches to Social Movement
Note: * These three characteristics are adapted from McAdam et al. (2005) and Tilly and Tarrow (2007:11).**MLNGO is 
short for movement-oriented labor nongovermntal organizations. 
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Political 
eras
State repressive 
waves 
Year No. of active MLNGOs
No. of selected 
WLCB cases
No. of workers 
involved
No. of worker 
representatives
Eviction in Sept. in SZ 2011 3 3 1499 36
2012 5 5 564 31
2013 8 17 9474 186
2014 9 19 7786 255
Arrest 7 in Dec. in GZ 2015 10 to 4 at year end 9 2867 64
2016 4 5 1273 47
2017 4 3 297 17
2018 4 2 1039 38
Arrest 5 in Jan. in SZ 2019 2 0 0 0
Hu-Wen 
era
Xi 
Jinping 
era
Table 2. Development of MLNGOs and WLCB across Hu-Wen Era and Xi Era
Post 2015
Note: SZ = Shenzhen, GZ=Guangzhou; for WLCB cases that occurred through mutiple years, I grouped them into the year 
that major protest activities took place. 
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Coded 
name
Year 
founded
Founder 
background City
Year join 
WLCB
Time leave 
WLCB Ethnographical fielwork and/or Interviews
A(LW) 2005 Lawyer SZ 2011 NA
Fieldwork May 2013-May 2014; interviews 
with head Dec. 20-21**, 2014, Jun. 12-Jul. 
12 2015, Jul.24-6, Sept. 6 & Nov.7-8 2016, 
Aug. 4 2018 (2 hours)**, Feb. 20, 2019 (1 
hour).
B(PY) 1998 Paralegal GZ 2011
2015 Dec.
closed by 
arrest
One week fieldwork Nov 5-12 2013; short 
visits May 12, Jul. 20-1, Sept. 16, Oct. 20, 
2013, Mar. 21 2014; interview head and two 
staff Aug. 23-4, one staff Oct. 5 2013, head 
and one staff Mar. 13-4 and Apr. 3-4 2014.
C(CF) 2005 Migrant 
worker SZ 2011
2019 Jan. 
closed by 
arrest
Visits Jul 28, Aug. 26, Dec. 21, 2013, 
Mar.11, May 1, 2014; interview with head 
and one staff Aug.23-4 2013, Apr. 3-4 2014, 
D(XYH) 2012 Migrant 
worker GZ 2012
2015 May
closed*
Visit Nov.25 2013; interview with head and 
one staff Aug. 23-4 2013 ,Mar. 13-4 2014, 
Nov. 7-8  2016 (1 hour).
E(ZS) 2012 Migrant 
worker ZS 2012
2014 
closed*
Interviews with head and one staff Aug 23-4 
2013 (2 hours), Mar. 13-4 2014 (2 hours).
F(XXC) 2003 Migrant 
worker SZ 2013 2015 Sept.
Visits Jul. 21 2013 , Apr. 15 2014 ; interview 
with two staff member Feb. 26 2014 (1 hour).
G(DGZ) 2000 Migrant 
worker SZ 2013 2015
Visit Dec. 7, 2015 (2 hours) ; interview with  
a staff Dec. 5 2013 (1.5 hours).
H(HHC) 2008 Migrant 
worker*** SZ 2013 2015 Aug. Interview with head Dec. 7 2013 (3 hours).
I(XGY) 2014 Migrant 
worker SZ 2014
2019 Jan. 
closed by 
arrest
Intensive interview with head Nov. 16 2015 
(2 hours),  Jun. 21-26 & Aug. 4 2018.
J(HG) 2014 Migrant 
worker GZ 2014 NA
Intensive interview with head Dec. 20-21 
2014, Aug. 29-31 2016,  Jan. 21-3 & Jun. 21-
6 (with staff too) 2018; with staff Jan. 10 
(half hour) & Feb. 27 (half hour) 2019; with 
head (4 hours) Aug. 10, 2019.
K(HZZ) 2015.May Migrant 
worker GZ 2015
2015 Dec. 
closed by 
arrest
Interview with former head, Oct. 27 2016 
(0.5 hour) .
Appendix A.Backgrounds of and Data Collection among Movement-oriented Labor NGOs (2013-2019)
Note: WLCB denotes worker-led collective bargaining; SZ= shenzhen, GZ=Guangzhou, ZS=Zhongshan; NA is not 
applicable; * "closed" by government repression;** Many interviews occurred throughout the day from 5 to 8 hours, 
unless otherwise denoted with specific length; ***Most migrant worker-founders held rural Hukou,  while founder of 
H(HHC) has an urban Hukou  in a median sized city at adjacent province and migrated to work in Guangdong.
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Time (year/month) Simplified firm name Place Key trigger(a)
Workers 
involved
No. of 
leaders
Mobilizatio
n time(d)
MLNGOs 
involved
2011 May-2012 Sep. Hengbao GZ SI(b) arrears 199 13 17 months B(PY) A(LW)
2011 Sept. BYD SZ Layoff SP (c) 100 11 1 month A(LW)
2011 Oct.-Nov Guangxing SZ Overtime pay arrear 1200 12 1 month A(LW)
2012 May-2013 Jun. Shiqiao GZ SI arrears etc 63 5 13 months B(PY) A(LW)
2012 Jun-2016 Apr. Panhua GZ Boss flee 40 5 4 years B(PY)
2012 Aug-2013 Oct. Gaoya GZ SI arrears etc 100 9 15 months B(PY)  
2012 Sept.-2014 Jan. Xiaolan ZS Overtime pay; reform union 150 6 17 months E(ZS) A(LW)
2013 Mar. Jingmi SZ Relocation SP;elect union 100 ND 1 month G(DGZ)
2013 Mar. -Jun. Yonglong GZ Relocation SP, SI arrears 300 ND 3 months D(XYH)
2013 Apr. 2016 Fed. Baode SZ SI arrears 1000 30 35 months F(XXC) A(LW)
2013 Apr.-Aug GZ hospital GZ Layoff SP & equal pay 122 11 4 months B(PY) A(LW）
2013 Apr.-May Diweixin SZ Relocation SP 450 13 1.5 months F(XXC) A(LW)
2013 May-Jun Jinmeida SZ Wage arrears & SP 20 3 1 month E(ZS)
2013 May-Jul Hitachi GZ SI arrears 300 5 3 months D(XYH)
2013 May-Oct Luenshing GZ Wage stagnation & layoff 300 15 6 months B(PY)
2013 May-Nov ASM SZ SZ Relocation SP or wage raise 5000 50 7 months H(HHC)
2013 Jul Xinxing SZ Layoff SP 106 11 1 month C(CF)
2013 Jul-Aug Gangqiao GZ Layoff SP 249 17 2 months B(PY)
2013 Jul-Aug Yitong ZS Wage arrears, SIA 34 3 1 month E(ZS)
2013 Jul-Oct Yinglin ZS Relocation 47 5 3 months E(ZS)
2013 Sept. Kaijiner ZS Wage cut & SI 53 5 0.5 month E(ZS)
2013 Sept-2014 Jul Sumida GZ SI arrears; elect union 1300 10 11 months D(XYH)
2013 Nov-Dec Linshi ZS Wage arrears 73 3 3 weeks E(ZS)
2013 Nov.-14 Jan. Juxin GZ Layoff SP and SI arrears 20 5 2.5 months B(PY)
2014 Apr.-Sept. Army hopsital GZ SI arrears & overtime pay 170 5 6 months B(PY)
2014 Apr.-2015 Jan. Qilitian SZ Benefit cut & SI arrears 500 13 10 months F(XXC) C(CF)
2014 May-Jun Sinotrans SZ Relocation 100 8 3 weeks C(CF)
2014 May-Jul Grosby SZ Benefit cut & upgrading 500 24 2 months A(LW)
2014 Jun-Nov. Foshan FS Wage decrease 59 5 5 months I(HG)
2014 Jun Power-One SZ Merger SP & SI arrears 500 ND 2 weeks C(CF)
2014 Jul-Aug. Meixing GZ Closure SP 20 4 18 days J(HG)
2014 Aug. WM 123 GZ Store closure 70 9 3 weeks B(PY)
2014 Aug.-Oct. Univ.Town GZ Change contractor SP&SIA 200 18 2 months B(PY)
2014 Aug.-Oct. Xing'ang DG Relocation SP & SI arrears 600 30 1.75 months A(LW)
2014 Sept. SZ Hengbao SZ Relocation SP 30 3 ND A(LW)
2014 Sept.-Dec Xinsheng GZ Relocation SP 117 7 3 months A(LW)
2014 Sept.-2015 May Lide GZ Relocation SP,SIA etc. 2750 61 9 months B(PY) I(HG)
2014 Oct.-Nov. Biguiyuan GZ Unclear terms in contract 280 ND 3 weeks J(HG)
2014 Oct.-2015 Jul. Qingsheng SZ Relocation SP & SI arrears 1000 30 10 months I(XGY) A(LW)
2014 Dec Xinli DG SI arrears & overtime pay 300 6 2 weeks C(CF)
2014 Dec.-2015 Jan. Tengqi GZ Relocation SP 70 8 1 month D(XYH) A(LW)
Appendix B. Selected 63 Worker-led Collective Bargaining Cases and Associated MLNGOs in South China 
(2011-March 2018)
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Time (year/month) Simplified firm name Place Key trigger(a)
Workers 
involved
No. of 
leaders
Mobilizatio
n time(d)
MLNGOs 
involved
2015 Mar.-April Cuiheng ZS Wage cut due to new plant 200 17 3 weeks J(HG)
2015 Mar.-April Hisense FS Relocation SP and SIA 400 15 1 week J(HG)
2015 Jun-Jul Tianbaoge GZ Closure SP and SI arrears 53 7 2 months K(HZZ)
2015 Oct. GZ shatou GZ Gov. contract change SP  40 5 1 month B(PY)
2015 Oct.-Nov. Junda,Huili SZ Wage and hours cut 2000 ND 39 days C(CF)
2015 Oct.-2016 Jan. Panhua 128 GZ Plant relocation SIA/SP 60 5 3 months J(HG)
2015 Nov. Huadou GZ Outsourcing SP 70 5 18 days B(PY)
2015 Nov. Fengyuan GZ Contract change SP 32 5 5 days B(PY)
2015 Nov.-2016.Jan Yahe GZ Department dissolution SP 12 5 10 weeks J(HG)
2016 Apr.-May Gaoyide SZ Disguised laid-off SP 50 10 2 weeks C(CF)
2016 Apr.-Sept. Qiyi 27 GZ Laid-off SP 23 5 4.5 months J(HG)
2016 May Guangxie SZ Relocation SP & SI arrears 100 15 1 week C(CF)
2016 Nov.-17 Jan. Newell SZ Firm transfer 1000 9 3 months A(LW)
2017 Mar.-May GZ parking GZ SP; SI arrears 179 5 2 months J(HG)
2017 Mar. Hengbao GZ Firm dissolution SI arrears 104 7 1 month J(HG)
2017 June-Jul Qiyi 7 GZ Relocation SP 14 5 6 weeks J(HG)
2017 Nov.-18 Mar. Simone GZ SI & housing fund arrears 1000 30 5 months I(XGY)
2018 Apr. Junjiatang GZ Relocation SP 39 8 1 month J(HG)
2012 Dec. Yanlian Shaanxi Resist dispatch 211 6 1 month A(LW)
2014 Mar.-Jun WM CD Hunan Store closure 120 9 3 months A(LW)
2014 Nov. Yuelu sani. Hunan Gov. contract change 400 15 18 days A(LW)
2016 Jul-Aug. WM NC Hubei New flexible work hours 100 8 2 months A(LW)
Worker-led collective bargaining outside Pearl River Delta
Note: GZ=Guangzhou, SZ=Shenzhen, ZS=Zhongshan, DG=Dongguan, FS=Foshan; reps. = representatives; ND denotes no 
data;  Key trigger (a) indicates the initial principal issue(s) that activate workers and does not cover all demands workers 
aggregated in later stage of mobilization; SI(b)= social insurance; SP(c) = severance pay; mobilization time (d) counts the 
time when workers and NGO first get in touch to the time or dispute settlement, action dissolution, or split between workers 
and NGO. 
Appendix B. Continued
 
